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Possible Relationships and Aspects from the Recent Brazilian Experience 
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In the past two decades there has been a widespread policy shift towards liberalization of the 
national economies.  It has entailed the lowering of tariff barriers, elimination of 
discriminatory treatment of foreign capital and privatization.  These changes have contributed 
to an increase in foreign direct investment and greater demand for competition legislation.  
The number of countries with competition laws has increased from less than forty in the 1980s 
to more than eighty in the late 1990s3.  
 
These trends raise three questions:  
i)  What is the impact of competition policy on the foreign direct investment?  Does 
competition policy deter or attract foreign direct investment? 
ii)  Can foreign direct investment have an anticompetitive effect?  Is competition policy –
and merger control in particular– necessary? 
iii) Does the acquisition of domestic firms by foreign firms rise particular competition 
concerns? 
 
Section 1 discusses the first question using a sample of 66 countries.  Sections 2 and 3 tackle 
the second and third questions, respectively, using the set of transactions reviewed in 1999 by 




1. Institutional Development of Competition Policy and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
There are two opposing views regarding the relationship between competition policy and 
foreign direct investment. On one hand, one could argue that developing countries should not 
prioritize competition policy because it would discourage foreign direct investment by 
creating additional regulatory barriers and risks for the investor.  The argument is analogous to 
the notion sometimes implicitly suggested that developing countries could accept lower 
environmental standards to avoid deterring potential investments.  On the other hand, it could 
be argued that competition policy attracts foreign investment because it provides a level 
playing field for fair competition among firms and a sound institutional environment. 
 
If either of these opposing views is correct, one should be able to identify a correlation 
between the degree of implementation of competition policy and foreign direct investment.  A 
negative correlation would suggest that competition policy possibly deters foreign direct 
investment, while a positive correlation would suggest that competition policy possibly 
attracts foreign direct investment.  In order to explore this relationship we will consider the 
correlation between  
foreign direct investment inflows over the period 1992-97 and the level of institutional 
development of the competition institutions in a sample of 66 countries.4  
  
                                                           
3 See Oliveira (1998a) and Oliveira (1998b). 
4 Data on FDI come from UNCTAD (1998) and UNCTAD (1999); other macro indicators are from WORLD 
BANK (1999).  
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1.1  Level of Institutional Development of Competition Policy 
 
Assessing the degree of institutional development of competition policy of a particular country 
is not a trivial matter. We adopt the evolutionary view of competition policy implementation 
proposed in  Oliveira (1998a, 1998b) and inspired by the work of Khemani and Dutz (1995) 
and Khemani (1997).  Competition policy is assumed to be implemented gradually, in a 
process containing several stages.  This gradual implementation process results from the 
circumstances usually faced by competition authorities.   
On the one hand, it is urgent to adopt competition policy in the liberalization process in order 
to promote a competitive economy.  If competition policy is not adopted at an early stage, the 
risk of anti-competitive structures is large and ex post solutions tend to be will be more costly.  
On the other hand, newly established competition institutions do not have the experience, 
personnel and financial resources to implement all aspects of competition policy at once. Thus 
the agency must focus its efforts on a few tasks and gradually expand the scope of its action as 
it becomes equipped to encompass those dimensions of competition policy which require more 
resources relative to its impact on social welfare. 
 
This gradual growth in the scope of the competition policy can be expressed as a sequence of 
stages of institutional development.  The stages are determined according to the degree of 
difficulty in evaluating if the benefits of a particular task of the competition institution can 
more than compensate the costs of its implementation.  The early stages will therefore focus 
primarily on combating firm behavior that is unequivocally damaging to the market.   
Advanced stages would then include more complex tasks which  require less trivial analysis to 
determine its net welfare impacts. The stages adopted in this study are presented in Table 1 
and described briefly in the subsequent paragraphs.  The tasks are cumulative, each stage 











































































Stage 1 includes countries which have no competition law or which have only recently begun 
its process of implementation. 
 
In Stage 2 the competition authority focuses on three main tasks:  the dissemination of the 




assistance from multilateral organizations and other jurisdictions.  Competition advocacy 
seeks to promote competition culture.  This task is particularly important in countries in which 
the economy was largely state controlled in the past, such as those in Eastern Europe  and 
Latin America.  The repression of anticompetitive behavior refers to  
the prosecution of those practices that are clearly anticompetitive such as price agreements 
among competitors.  
 
Stage 3 is characterized by the addition of initial steps in examining vertical agreements and 
merger control.  Both require careful analysis of the net impact on social welfare. 
  
In Stage 4 merger control and monitoring of vertical agreements have been fully implemented. 
  
In Stage 5 the initial steps of institutional agreements are taken.  In the domestic arena, 
cooperation with regulatory agencies is needed to enforce competition policy in industries 
characterized by temporary natural monopolies.  In the international arena cooperation is 
sought with other jurisdictions to better enforce competition policy in regard to cross-border 
practices and transactions.  This goes beyond the technical assistance mentioned in Stage 2;  it 
entails further technical exchange and standardization of the criteria and procedures. 
 
In Stage 6 the cooperation agreements with regulatory agencies and foreign competition 
institutions are established and operational. 
 
Finally in Stage 7, institutional maturity is obtained.  In this stage 'second-generation 
agreements' among competition institutions of different countries are established in order to 
rule on mergers outside the particular competition institution but with significant ramifications 
in the local economy.  The competition authority  also takes on a pro-active stance in 
competition advocacy, participating in the analysis of new legislation that may have an impact 
on competition. 
 
1.2  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
 
In order to compare the attraction of foreign direct investment among countries it is necessary 
to control for the relative size of each country.  Two  ways of adjusting for the relative size of 
countries are examined:  foreign direct investment per capita and foreign direct investment per 
gross domestic product. 
 
Theoretically, when comparing developing and developed countries it may be more 
appropriate to make the adjustment based on  population because the share of foreign direct 
investment in total investment in developing countries should be larger than in developed 
countries due to the higher marginal productivity of capital in the latter. Adjusting foreign 
direct investment by gross domestic product would therefore understate the level of foreign 
direct investment  
 
inflows to developed countries.  In any case, we present the results using both forms of 
adjustment.  The data are presented in Tables 1A and 2A of the Appendix.  
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1.3  The Results 
 
The correlation between the level of institutional development of the competition institutions 
and foreign direct investment per gross domestic product is -0.080880  while the correlation 
using foreign direct investment per capita is +0.280047.  Tables 2 and 3 present the scatter 
diagrams for the level of institutional development and foreign direct investment adjusted for 
population and gross domestic product, respectively.  
 
Table 2 









Correlation between FDI and competition policy using GDP 
 
                                                           
5  The outlier in the first graph represents Singapore.  In line with the arguments of the delegates of this country 
in various international fora, one could argue that Singapore and other states may have an advanced 
competition regime though they do not have a competition law. This argument has been refuted in Oliveira 




























































































Source: UNCTAD (1997), UNCTAD (1998) and World Bank (1998)  
 
 
The simple correlation is not the most appropriate indicator because the level of institutional 
development of the competition institutions used in this study is only a qualitative indicator.  It 
is only used to establish an ordinal ranking of the countries' competition institutions, not a 
cardinal ranking.  A more appropriate way to examine the relationship between the  
 
institutional development of the competition institutions and foreign direct investment inflow 
is the Spearman correlation of the rankings by the two variables.6  
 
The Spearman correlation indicates that there is a small, significant and positive correlation 
between the two variables, as presented in Table 4.  The Spearman correlation is positive and 
significant at a 95% confidence interval when foreign direct investment per capita is used, and 
positive and significant at a 90% confidence interval when foreign direct investment per gross 
domestic product is used. 
 
Table 4 suggests that there is no evidence that the institutional development of competition 
institutions hampers foreign direct investment.  On the contrary, there appears to be small but 
positive relationship between the two variables, which suggests that institutional development 








Correlation between FDI and level of institutional development of competition policy 
 
     
                                                           
6  Among others, see ANDERSON, D., SWEENEY, D. AND WILLIAMS, T. (1990). The ranking of the 
institutional development of competition institutions within each of the stages was made in decreasing order 
of the foreign direct investment inflows per gross domestic product.  
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  *    Significant at the 90% confidence interval. 
  **  Significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
2.  Merger Control and Foreign Direct Investment:  Evidence from Brazil 
 
The second question focuses on the need of competition policy and in particular merger 
control when regarding foreign direct investment.  Even if competition policy does not hamper 
foreign direct investment inflows, the application of competition policy with respect to foreign 
investment is sometimes questioned because one could argue that foreign direct investment 
would always have a positive effect on competition.   
 
However, when FDI occurs through mergers and acquisitions, one could argue that productive 
capacity is not increased and there may be an increase in market concentration.  In fact, an 
increasing share of FDI represents mergers and acquisitions as opposed to  
 
greenfield investment. According to the most recent data of UNCTAD, the ratio between 
M&As and FDI in developing countries has risen from 15% in 1991-95 to 35% in 1996-99.7 
This section will focus on the verification of the validity of this argument based on the 
examination of mergers and acquisitions involving foreign capital in Brazil. 
 
An examination of all mergers and acquisitions reviewed by CADE in 1999 suggests that 
much of the foreign direct investment in Brazil may have a potential effect on competition and 
thus merits scrutiny by CADE.  Recent studies of the Brazilian economy using sectoral data 
have shown that FDI has provoked impacts upon the market structure8.  Instead of sectoral 
data which may not depict the antitrust concept of relevant market, we use the set of mergers 
and acquisitions involving foreign capital analyzed by CADE in 1999. The sample was 
divided into four categories:  
1.  foreign firms which effectively participated the Brazilian market through exports prior 
to the merger or acquisition; 
2.  foreign firms which effectively participated in the Brazilian market with subsidiaries 
operating in Brazil prior to the merger or acquisition; 
 
 
3.  foreign firms which were potential competitors in the Brazilian market prior to the 
merger or acquisition;9 
                                                           
7 UNCTAD (2000) 
8 MOREIRA (1999). 
9  This third category represents firms that did not actively participate in the Brazilian market either in Brazil or 
through exports but were already active in the same (or close) relevant markets in other countries.  For an  
7 
4.  foreign firms which were not potential competitors in the Brazilian market prior to the 
merger or acquisition. 
 
 
The first three types represent mergers or acquisitions which may have potential effects on 
competition in the spirit of the caput of Article 54 of the Brazilian competition law.  Only for 




Cases involving direct investment analysed by CADE in 1999 





The evidence from Brazil is summarized in Table 5.  Only 4 of the 192 cases analyzed by 
CADE in 1999 involved the entry of new competitors in the market without possible anti-
competitive effects. Thus, most mergers and acquisitions involving foreign direct investment 
do pose a potential effect upon competition, thus justifying merger control.  
 
3. Globalization, Denationalization and Competition Policy 
 
We have also examined if the mergers and acquisitions were national or global transactions, 
that is, if the motivating factor for the mergers and acquisitions were predominantly domestic  
 
or international restructuring.  Again we consider the merger and acquisitions data reviewed 
by CADE in 1999.  The data indicate that roughly a quarter of mergers and acquisitions 
involving foreign investment are the result of global transactions, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
                                                                                                                                                                                        









Transaction Type Source: CADE. 
8 
Ratio of cases which resulted from global operations in total of cases analysed by CADE 






Ratio of cases invilving foreign direct investment in wich domestic firms were acquired 





We also identify the share of mergers and acquisitions that result in denationalization of a 
Brazilian firm.  There seems to be a growing concern in Brazil with respect to the origin of the  
control of the firms. Among other presumably negative effects, it is frequently argued that the 
outflow of profits and dividends could pose balance-of-payments problems. Here we are 
concerned with possible peculiarities of the cases involving denationalization as far as 
competition policy is concerned. 
 
In 1999 over a third of the cases involved foreign acquisition of control of a national firm. 
There is no evidence, however, that those transactions should raise more concern than others 















Domestic firms acquired by foreign firms analyses by CADE 
discriminated by transaction type 
 
 
Indeed, as Table 8 shows, the share of transactions with no potential to negatively affect 
competition in 1999 was larger in cases which involved foreign acquisition of control of a national 
firm than in all other cases: 3 in 80 versus 1 in 104.   
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
In summary, this study has provided evidence to answer the three questions proposed in the 
Introduction: 
i)  there appears to be no evidence that the development of competition policy deters 
foreign direct investment inflows.   
ii)  Brazil's experience suggests that mergers and acquisitions involving foreign capital 
merit scrutiny by the competition agency because they do present potential effects on 
competition.  Furthermore, cooperation among competition authorities of different  
 
iii)  jurisdictions is shown to be important due to the share of mergers and acquisitions that 
are of global scope.   
iv)  there is a significant level of denationalization of Brazilian firms reflected in the 
sample chosen, but the phenomenon does not seem to present specific competition 
problems that would justify a differential treatment such as a possible change in the 
notification requirements for foreign firms. 
The above conclusions should obviosly be qualified by the general nature of the information 
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5.  Appendix 























Singapore 2  2,383.7778 38  1  1.369 
Belgium 5  1,129.8333 12  2  100 
Sweden 6  741.8333 7  3  16 
Norway 5  624.5000 17  4  169 
New Zealand  7  613.0000 1  5  16 
Netherlands 5  540.5938 14  6  64 
Denmark 5  507.2667 18  7  121 
Switzerland 6  401.5952 9  8  1 
Australia 7  373.7632 2  9  49 
United Kingdom  7  356.7090 3  10  49 
France 6  345.7006 8  11  9 
Israel 5  265.7778 16  12  16 
Canada 7  241.6056 4  13  81 
Hungry 4  224.6000 26  14  144 
Finland 5  218.8333 23  15  64 
Malaysia 1  214.9921 44  16  784 
Spain 5  209.3590 19  17  4 
United States of America  7  207.3924 5  18  169 
Austria 5  195.8542 24  19  25 
Chile   3  160.6111 32  20  144 
Portugal 5  129.7167 20  21  1 
Czech Republic  3  128.6833 33  22  121 
Argentina 3  119.9815 35  23  144 
Greece 5  101.7121 21  24  9 
Mexico 5  86.9316 13  25  144 
Panama 4  78.1111 27  26  1 
Peru 2  76.7067 40  27  169 
Poland 4  74.4658 28  28  0 
Venezuela 5  69.0217 15  29  196 
Italy 6  65.1316 10  30  400 
Uruguay 1  50.6667 56  31  625 
Colombia 3  50.1798 34  32  4 
Brazil 5  38.6037 22  33  121 
Dominican Republic  1  37.7708 47  34  169 
Slovak Republic  4  37.6333 29  35  36 
Ecuador 1  37.1111 48  36  144 
Bolivia 1  35.9167 45  37  64 
Thailand 2  35.8197 41  38  9 
Paraguay 1  34.5667 50  39  121 
Germany 7  34.2947 6  40  1.156 
Republic of Korea  5  31.0362 25  41  256 
China 2  26.4068 39  42  9 
Turkmenistan 1  21.4500 49  43  36 
Indonesia 1  18.1517 51  44  49 
South Africa  4  16.3289 30  45  225 
Philippines 1  15.6415 52  46  36 
Morocco 1  15.2798 55  47  64 
Vietnam 1  15.1645 43  48  25 
Russia 2  14.4093 42  49  49 
Egypt 1  11.8778 53  50  9 
Nicaragua 1  11.3667 46  51  25 
Turkey 4  11.2005 31  52  441 
Japan 6  9.7183 11  53  1.764 
Guatemala 1  8.8485 59  54  25 
Honduras 1  8.4167 54  55  1 
Moldavia 1  8.1250 57  56  1 
Zimbabwe 3  6.2424 36  57  441 
Jordan 1  4.5417 62  58  16 
El Salvador  1  4.3889 63  59  16 
Senegal 1  3.5926 60  60  0 
Mongolia 1  2.1667 58  61  9 
India 3  1.6285 37  62  625 
Cameroon 1  1.3333 65  63  4 
Malawi 1  0.8833 61  64  9 
Nepal 1  0.3986 64  65  1 
Nigeria 1  0.3800 66  66  0 
     Source: UNCTAD (1997), UNCTAD (1998)  and WORLD BANK (1998) . 
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Singapore 2  7,42%  38  1  1.369 
Vietnam 1  6,09%  43  2  1.681 
Malaysia 1  5,79%  44  3  1.681 
Hungry 4  5,44%  26  4  484 
China 2  5,19%  39  5  1.156 
New Zealand  7  4,67%  1  6  25 
Bolivia 1  4,63%  45  7  1.444 
Belgium  5  4,63%  12 8 16 
Chile   3  4,10%  32  9  529 
Peru 2  3,95%  40  10  900 
Panama 4  3,27%  27  11  256 
Czech Republic  3  3,21%  33  12  441 
Sweden 6  3,15%  7  13  36 
Nicaragua 1  2,99%  46  14  1.024 
Colombia 3  2,80%  34  15  361 
Dominican Republic  1  2,75%  47  16  961 
Poland 4  2,72%  28  17  121 
Ecuador 1  2,70%  48  18  900 
Mexico  5  2,61%  13 19 36 
Netherlands  5  2,44%  14 20 36 
Turkmenistan 1  2,44%  49  21  784 
Venezuela  5  2,41%  15 22 49 
Paraguay 1  2,21%  50  23  729 
Australia 7  2,11%  2  24  484 
Indonesia 1  2,03%  51  25  676 
United Kingdom  7  2,02%  3  26  529 
Israel 5  1,99%  16  27  121 
Norway 5  1,92%  17  28  121 
Philippines 1  1,79%  52  29  529 
Denmark 5  1,70%  18  30  144 
Argentina  3  1,56%  35 31 16 
Spain 5  1,53%  19  32  169 
Egypt 1  1,50%  53  33  400 
Thailand  2  1,49%  41 34 49 
France 6  1,46%  8  35  729 
Honduras 1  1,41%  54  36  324 
Portugal 5  1,40%  20  37  289 
Morocco 1  1,37%  55  38  289 
Canada 7  1,33%  4  39  1.225 
Greece 5  1,31%  21  40  361 
Slovak Republic  4  1,27%  29  41  144 
Zimbabwe  3  1,07%  36 42 36 
Brazil 5  1,06%  22  43  441 
Switzerland 6  1,04%  9  44  1.225 
Finland 5  1,03%  23  45  484 
Uruguay 1  0,96%  56  46  100 
Moldavia 1  0,88%  57  47  100 
Mongolia 1  0,84%  58  48  100 
United States of America  7  0,82%  5  49  1.936 
Austria 5  0,76%  24  50  676 
Guatemala  1  0,70%  59 51 64 
Senegal  1  0,64%  60 52 64 
Russia 2  0,58%  42  53  121 
India 3  0,53%  37  54  289 
Malawi  1  0,51%  61 55 36 
South Africa  4  0,51%  30  56  676 
Turkey 4  0,47%  31  57  676 
Republic of Korea  5  0,35%  25  58  1.089 
Italy 6  0,34%  10  59  2.401 
Jordan 1  0,31%  62  60  4 
El Salvador  1  0,31%  63  61  4 
Nepal 1  0,23%  64  62  4 
Cameroon 1  0,21%  65  63  4 
Germany 7  0,13%  6  64  3.364 
Japan 6  0,03%  11  65  2.916 
Nigeria 1  0,01%  66  66  0 
    Source:  UNCTAD (1997), UNCTAD (1998)  and WORLD BANK (1998) . 
 
Notes on Brazil’s merger and acquisitions data for 1999  
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The number of merger and acquisition cases involving foreign companies judged by CADE in 
1999 adds up to 184.  In the paper the following cases were excluded for the following 
reasons: 
  
1.  Ato de Concentração (concentration act) AC n
o 08012.008619/98-86 did not involve foreign 
direct investment into Brazil;  it consisted of a merger between two firms which exported to 
Brazil. 
2.  AC nº 180/97 involved a bankruptcy proceeding, in which the failed firm was bought by 
several firms (including a foreign firm). 
3.  AC nº  08012.005232/98-50 involved the purchase of a foreign firm by another foreign firm, 
thus it only consisted of a substitution of foreign capital. 
4.  AC nº 08012.005234/98-85 was the consequence of another acquisition case already included 
in the sample in AC 08012.007154/97-38. 
5.  AC nº 63/95 was a joint venture involving several domestic firms and an international firm, 
thus not a case of foreign direct investment. 
6.  AC nº 08012.005760/98-18 was excluded because the transaction was a consequence of an 
acquisition already considered in AC nº 08012.009887/98-61. 
 
 
Although Concentration Act  n º 08012.007682/98-87 was a joint-venture between a national 
and an international firms, it was included in the sample because it will involve foreign direct 
investment in a market in which 78% of the supply is currently through imports.  
Concentration Act n º 08012.009729/98-10 was also included inspite of the fact that it 
consisted of an internal rearrangement of the control group of the company. 
The sample also included the following cases involving State telecommunication firms that 
were privatized in 1999: Embratel Participações S.A., Telesp Participações S.A., Tele Sudeste 
Celular Participações S.A., Tele Centro Oeste Celular Participações S.A., Tele Nordeste 
Celular Participações S.A., Telemig Celular Participações S.A., Tele Norte Celular 
Participações S.A. e Tele Celular Sul Participações S.A. 
 
The joint-venture examined in Concentration Act nº 08012.007682/98-87 was also included in 
the sample because it involved several foreign firms which will gradually enter the Brazilian 
market, even though initially only through exports.  
 
The four categories used in the analysis are based on three simplifying assumptions: 
 
1.  Only one relevant geographic market is considered in each case; 
2.  only one relevant product market is considered in each case, 
3.  firms belonging to the same product market but different geographic markets have a 
positive effect on competition in the relevant geographic market by increasing   
contestability. 
The above simplifying assumptions were necessary in order to deal with a large number of 
transactions. A case-study appraoch would permit the analysis of all the relevant markets in 
each case. 